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Although the monitoring mechanisms established under international
human rights agreements do not receive as much public attention as the
substantive rights that the agreements recognize, they are equally impor-
tant. In the domestic context, when a right is newly recognized it can be
implemented through already existing administrative and legal institu-
tions. This is rarely true of international human rights agreements. In-
ternational administrative and legal institutions are still embryonic, and
the implementation of each new human rights accord normally involves
the creation of an entirely new monitoring system to encourage compli-
ance. Over time, the monitoring institutions and practices established
under international human rights agreements may become sufficiently ro-
bust and flexible to support new accretions of responsibility. For the
time being, however, substantial innovation is still required.
Indeed, the rapidly evolving character of international administrative
and legal institutions lends a double importance both to the monitoring
provisions of new human rights agreements ' and to experimental proce-
dures introduced by existing monitoring bodies.2 In addition to perform-
t Ph.D., New School for Social Research; J.D. Candidate, Yale University.
1. For example, the Organization of American States is currently considering a draft pro-
tocol on economic and social rights to be added to the American Convention on Human
Rights. ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERI-
CAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1985-1986, at 195-211 (1986).
2. The monitoring bodies established or designated under human rights agreements pos-
sess discretionary control over their own procedural rules and work methods and can thus
exert some influence over the specific design features of the monitoring processes they super-
vise. Human rights monitoring mechanisms cannot be completely specified in advance. More-
over, the consequences of procedural decisions made to implement monitoring provisions are
often both significant and controversial. For example, after the European Social Charter en-
tered into force, a dispute arose over whether the Committee of Experts that considers state
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ing an obvious role in implementing specific agreements, these
innovations add to the general institutional flux from which models for
future institutions emerge. For this reason, monitoring systems that
evolve under human rights agreements have an importance which tran-
scends their immediate goals.
There is a particular need, in this regard, to develop effective monitor-
ing mechanisms for use in implementing international agreements re-
specting economic and social human rights.3 This need stems both from
special difficulties associated with the task of monitoring compliance
with existing international agreements respecting economic and social
human rights,4 and from the fact that private human rights organizations
have not been active in supplementing official monitoring activities in
this area.
5
This comment suggests ways in which monitoring mechanisms suita-
ble for use in the implementation of economic and social human rights
agreements might be rendered more effective and politically palatable.
More specifically, it identifies the principal types of monitoring mecha-
nisms available for use in the implementation of economic and social
human rights agreements and discusses a variety of ways in which these
mechanisms can be configured (or reconfigured) to enhance their effec-
tiveness and political appeal. The emphasis in this analysis is on the po-
reports submitted under the agreement should include state-specific recommendations for pol-
icy changes in its own conclusory reports. The Charter itself neither mandates nor prohibits
such a practice. Resolution of the issue was perceived as having a significant effect on the
strength of the Charter's monitoring mechanism. See A. MOWER, INTERNATIONAL COOPER-
ATION FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 208-30 (1985). Another example of the evolution of monitoring
structures is provided by the United Nations Economic and Social Council's efforts to define
the type of working committee appropriate for evaluating the state reports that it receives
under the monitoring provisions of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights. See infra text accompanying notes 41-45.
3. The current distinction made between economic and social human rights, on the one
hand, and civil and political human rights, on the other hand, originated in disagreements
which arose during the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.
217A, 3 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doe. A/810 (1948). Since then, it has become customary to use
the term "political and civil rights" to refer to rights that tend to ensure such things as free-
dom of conscience, expression, and association; equal protection and due process of law; free-
dom from slavery and torture; and freedom of assembly and participation in political affairs.
In other words, "civil and political rights" are rights such as those singled out for protection in
the Bill of Rights and other amendments to the U.S. Constitution. In contrast, the term "eco-
nomic and social rights" are rights that tend to ensure such things as access to work, educa-
tion, and medical care; an adequate material standard of living; and the freedom to retain and
cultivate a cultural identity. Such rights are not afforded significant constitutional protection
in the United States, and there is a tendency to regard them as inferior to civil and political
rights, if they are considered to be rights at all.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 10-27.
5. See Alston, The United Nations' Specialized Agencies and Implementation of the Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 79,
104-05 (1979).
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tential importance of even relatively small adjustments in the structural
and procedural architecture of a specific type of monitoring mechanism,
and on the relatively large number of such potentially effective adjust-
ments available to the designers of actual monitoring systems.
I begin with a brief discussion of the nature of the obligations incurred
by parties to existing international agreements respecting economic and
social human rights. This discussion emphasizes the inherently greater
difficulty of monitoring state compliance with agreements that impose
only promotional obligations with respect to the "rights" they enumer-
ate, as opposed to agreements that impose an obligation to guarantee the
enumerated "rights" immediately. I then describe the general form of
the monitoring mechanisms established under three key international
agreements operative in this field of international law-the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),6 the Eu-
ropean Social Charter,7 and the Constitution of the International Labor
Organization.8 Although the monitoring regimes established under all
three agreements rely primarily on state reporting systems, significant
differences exist among them. Finally, I analyze the inherent strengths
and weaknesses of the state reporting systems, as well as of two other
types of monitoring mechanisms suitable for use in implementing eco-
nomic and social human rights agreements-complaint procedures and
independent commission inquiries. As indicated above, the focus of this
analysis is on the many ways in which each of these mechanisms can be
configured.
I. Promotional Obligations Versus Immediate Guarantees
The effectiveness of the monitoring mechanisms established under
human rights agreements depends not only on the nature of the mecha-
nisms themselves, but also on the nature of the substantive obligations
incurred by the parties to the agreements. It is therefore appropriate to
begin our discussion of monitoring mechanisms with a brief inquiry into
the nature of the obligations incurred by state parties to existing eco-
nomic and social human rights agreements.
I am not referring here to the listings of rights contained in such agree-
ments, but to the obligations incurred by states with regard to the reali-
zation of those rights. The ultimate goal of economic and social human
rights agreements is to ensure the realization of rights such as assured
6. G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doe. A/6316 (1966) [here-
inafter ICESCR].
7. Oct. 18, 1961, Europ. T.S. No. 35, 529 U.N.T.S. 89 [hereinafter Charter].
8. 62 Stat. 3485, T.I.A.S. No. 1868, 15 U.N.T.S. 35 [hereinafter ILO Constitution].
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access to education, medical care, food, and work (just as the ultimate
goal of civil and political human rights agreements is to ensure the reali-
zation of rights such as freedom of conscience, expression, and associa-
tion).9 In the analysis that follows, however, the substance of these
rights is less important than the specific nature of the undertakings to
which the parties to an agreement commit themselves.
While some articles of the ICESCR specify particular undertakings to
which state parties obligate themselves,10 the general obligation they in-
cur is "to take steps ... to the maximum of [their] available resources,
with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights
recognized in the present Covenant."" In other words, the state parties
commit themselves only to working towards the realization of the rights
specified in the ICESCR, not to guarantee them immediately. In this
respect, the ICESCR imposes less stringent obligations on its adherents
than does its counterpart Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. State
parties to the latter agreement incur an obligation to guarantee most of
the rights enumerated in the agreement immediately. There the general
obligation of a state party is "to ensure to all individuals within its terri-
tory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present
Covenant,"12 not simply to "take steps" towards the realization of these
rights.
In addition to the vague domestic commitment implicit in the
ICESCR's general obligation, adhesion to the agreement entails accept-
ance of an obligation to support a variety of international actions for the
purpose of promoting the realization of economic and social human
rights. These actions include "the conclusion of conventions, the adop-
tion of recommendations, the furnishing of technical assistance and the
9. See supra note 3.
10. The most specific of these is contained in article 14, under which states not yet provid-
ing free compulsory primary education in their metropolitan areas or other territories under
their jurisdiction agree, within two years of their becoming a party to the agreement, to adopt a
plan to provide such education "within a reasonable number of years, to be fixed in the plan."
ICESCR, supra note 6, art. 14. In most of the other articles in which rights are specified, the
state parties merely "recognize" the rights in question and bind themselves only to the general
obligations specified in article 2(1). In four articles, somewhat stronger language is used. The
state parties undertake to "guarantee" the right to non-discriminatory treatment (art. 2(2)); to
"ensure" both the equal right of men and women to enjoy the rights recognized in the Cove-
nant (art. 3), and the right to freedom of association (in trade unions) (art. 8); and to "respect"
freedom of scientific research and creative activity (art. 15(3)). ICESCR, supra note 6. What
distinguishes these rights from those which the state parties simply "recognize" is their dual
identity. They are civil rights as well as economic rights, and the privileged status they are
accorded under the ICESCR seems to follow from the generally stronger protection afforded
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, 52, U.N. Doe. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter ICCPR].
11. ICESCR, supra note 6, art. 2(1).
12. ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 2(1).
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holding of regional meetings and technical meetings for the purpose of
consultation and study organized in conjunction with the Governments
concerned."
13
Because of the limited nature of these obligations, it has become cus-
tomary to refer to the rights protected by the ICESCR as "relative,"
"progressive," "programmatic," or "promotional," and to contrast them
with the "absolute," "immediate," or "legally justiciable" rights pro-
tected by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.1
4 It
should be noted, however, that there is nothing inherent in economic and
social rights that limits them in this way. Economic and social rights can
be guaranteed immediately, like any other right, so long as the state par-
ties to an agreement respecting them are willing to undertake an obliga-
tion to do so. 15
To be sure, states generally have been unwilling to accept such obliga-
tions with regard to economic and social rights. The same is often true,
however, of certain political and civil rights. The clearest example of this
is the right of self-determination declared in the first article of both the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the ICESCR. State parties to
these agreements bind themselves only to "promote the realization of the
right," not to guarantee its immediate achievement. 16 It has similarly
been observed that the obligation of states to "take appropriate steps to
ensure equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage,
during marriage and at its dissolution" is also purely promotional.' 7
Rather than attempting to distinguish between civil and economic
rights on this basis, it would be more accurate to say that states tend to
resist incurring an obligation to guarantee (rather than merely to pro-
mote) a right immediately whenever realization of that right would either
be very expensive or would require fundamental structural changes in the
society. It is in this context that the frequently cited distinction between
13. ICESCR, supra note 6, art. 23.
14. Vierdag, The Legal Nature of the Rights Granted by the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 9 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 69, 80-81, 83-84 (1978); cf. P.
SIEGHART, THE LAWFUL RIGHTS OF MANKIND 81-83, (1985) (arguing that the customary
distinctions made between economic and social rights on the one hand and civil and political
rights on the other are largely artificial).
15. Vierdag acknowledges as much, although he concludes that the indefinite character of
the obligations imposed on state parties to the ICESCR means that "the rights granted by the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights are of such a nature as to be
legally negligible." Vierdag, supra note 14, at 83-86, 105.
16. ICESCR, supra note 6, art. 1(3); ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 1(3).
17. ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 23(4); see Schwelb, Some Aspects of the International Cove-
nants on Human Rights of December 1966, in THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 7TH NOBEL SYMPOSIUM 103, 108 (A. Eide & A. Schou eds.
1968) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION].
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positive rights (those that require state action for their realization) and
negative rights (those that require state abstention) is relevant.1 8 It is not
true, though, that economic and social rights are inherently positive in
this sense, while civil and political rights are inherently negative. Con-
sider, for example, the problem of racial discrimination. Few people in
the United States today would question that such discrimination violates
human rights standards, but the nation's history (for example, in the area
of school desegregation) amply demonstrates that extensive and exceed-
ingly intrusive governmental action may be required in order to achieve
reasonable compliance with these standards. Undoubtedly, the realiza-
tion of many economic and social human rights would be equally difficult
to achieve. The difficulty lies not in their characterization as economic
and social rights, however, but in the profound social, economic, and
political changes that would be required to guarantee them.
The claim that the realization of economic and social rights requires
state action, while the realization of civil and political rights merely calls
for state abstention from action, is also based on the assumption that a
state's obligations under a human rights agreement only implicate gov-
ernmental behavior. If the right not to be victimized by racial discrimi-
nation is indeed a human right, however, then it is hard to justify a
distinction that would find a violation of that right in the behavior of
individuals acting as government agents, but not in the behavior of indi-
viduals acting for private interests.
What are the obligations of a government to protect its citizenry from
human rights violations by private parties? Surely something more than
abstention from doing positive harm is required. While determining the
extent of a state's obligation to take affirmative steps in such areas is not
easy, as soon as the obligation is acknowledged the conventional distinc-
tion between "negative" and "positive" rights no longer holds. The right
to be free from racial discrimination may still be characterized as a "neg-
ative" right, but "positive" state action might be required to protect it.
Whether the action required to realize particular civil and political rights
is greater than that required to realize particular economic and social
rights depends on the nature of the right, the character of existing social
institutions, and the degree to which they are susceptible to change
through state action.
Whatever the difficulties associated with the realization of particular
rights, the task of monitoring a state's compliance with a human rights
agreement will be easier when the state's obligations take the form of an
18. See, ag., Vierdag, supra note 14, at 80-82; A. MOWER, supra note 2, at 3.
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immediate guarantee of those rights rather than an obligation merely to
promote them. This follows because the scope of promotional obliga-
tions is indefinite in comparison to obligations to guarantee particular
rights immediately. The European Social Charter illustrates one form
that immediate guarantees can take in an economic and social human
rights agreement. State parties to the Charter incur two types of obliga-
tions: the parties are generally obligated to "accept as the aim of their
policy" (i.e., to promote) the realization of all of the rights specified in
the Charter, 19 but they also must agree to "consider themselves bound"
to guarantee immediately a self-selected subset of those rights.20 In this
respect, the Charter imposes obligations that are considerably more strin-
gent than those assumed by state parties to the ICESCR. Moreover,
while still phrased in general terms, the Charter also attempts to specify
what public policies a state party must implement to satisfy its obliga-
tions with regard to those rights that it agrees to guarantee immediately.
The convention system of the International Labor Organization (ILO)
provides another model for including immediate guarantees in interna-
tional agreements respecting economic and social human rights.21 The
ILO Constitution imposes on a member state the obligation to protect
specific economic and social human rights only if that state has ratified
one or more of the conventions adopted by the Organization's General
Conference.22 Over 150 such conventions have been adopted since 1919,
with member states ratifying an average of thirty-three conventions
each. 23 The conventions themselves are detailed agreements focusing on
issues ranging from particular work hazards, such as benzene exposure,
24
to general freedoms, such as the right to organize and engage in collec-
19. Charter, supra note 7, pt. I (introductory paragraph) & pt. III, art. 20(l)(a).
20. Id. pt. II (introductory paragraph) & pt. III, art. 20.
21. The ILO was established as part of the peace accords ending World War I and is now a
specialized agency of the United Nations. On the origins and history of the Organization, see
generally J. SHOTWELL, THE ORIGINS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION
(1934); Beguin, ILO and the Tripartite System, 523 INT'L CONCILIATION 405 (1959); D.
MORSE, THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE I.L.O. AND ITS ROLE IN THE WORLD COM-
MUNITY (1969); A. TIKRITI, TRIPARTISM AND THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZA-
TION (1982).
22. Having ratified a convention, a member state incurs an obligation to "take such action
as may be necessary to make effective the provisions of such Convention." ILO Constitution,
supra note 8, art. 19(5)(d).
23. A. TIKRrrI, supra note 21, at 377-83.
24. Convention Respecting Protection Against Benzene Poisoning (ILO Convention No.
136), adopted June 23, 1971, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION, INTERNA-
TIONAL LABOUR CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 1919-1981, at 377-80 (1982).
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tive bargaining. 25 Some conventions require immediate guarantees26
while others merely impose promotional obligations.
27
Thus international agreements respecting economic and social human
rights vary in the balance that they strike between the duty to promote
and the duty to guarantee; while it is possible to monitor compliance
with both types of obligations, it is inherently more difficult to do so with
regard to the former. This point warrants emphasis, because some moni-
toring mechanisms may be more suitable than others for dealing with
this difficulty. With this in mind, I examine below the monitoring mech-
anisms embodied in the ICESCR, the European Social Charter, and the
ILO Constitution.
II. Existing Monitoring Mechanisms
A. The International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights
The implementation provisions of the ICESCR are contained in arti-
cles 16 through 23 of the agreement. 28 These provisions establish a state
reporting system under the aegis of the Economic and Social Council of
the United Nations (ECOSOC).29 State parties to the ICESCR are obli-
gated to submit reports on "the measures which they have adopted and
the progress made in achieving the observance of the rights recognized"
25. Right of Association (Agriculture) Convention (entered into force May 11, 1923);
Convention Concerning Right to Organize (ILO Convention No. 87), adopted July 9, 1948;
Convention Concerning Right to Collective Bargaining (ILO Convention No. 98), adopted
July 1, 1949; Rural Worker's Organizations Convention (ILO Convention No. 141), adopted
June 23, 1975; Collective Bargaining Convention (ILO Convention No. 154), adopted June 19,
1981. INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION, supra note 24, at 3-8, 15-17, 218-20.
26. For example, a ratifier of Convention No. 11 "undertakes to secure to all those en-
gaged in agriculture the same rights of association and combination as to industrial workers,
and to repeal any statutory or other provisions restricting such rights in the case of those
engaged in agriculture." Right of Association (Agriculture) Convention (ILO Convention No.
11), art. 1. INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION, supra note 24, at 3.
27. For example, a ratifier of Convention No. 154 is obligated to take "[m]easures adapted
to national conditions... to promote collective bargaining." Collective Bargaining Conven-
tion (ILO Convention No. 154), art. 5(l). INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION, supra
note 24, at 219.
28. ICESCR, supra note 6. For a fuller description of the ICESCR's implementation
mechanisms, see Das, United Nations Institutions and Procedures Founded on Conventions on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, in THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 303, 331-34 (K. Vasak & P. Alston eds. 1982) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL
DIMENSIONS).
29. The Economic and Social Council consists of 54 members elected by the General As-
sembly for staggered three-year terms. It occupies a position in the structure of the U.N. that
formally parallels that of the Security Council, though its powers are more limited. See U.N.
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, EVERYBODY'S UNITED NATIONS 14-20 (1986). Its
province includes the promotion of human rights, and it drafted both the ICESCR and the
ICCPR.
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in the ICESCR.30 The reports are to be completed "in stages, in accord-
ance with a programme to be established by the Economic and Social
Council."'31 They are submitted to the Secretary General of the United
Nations who then forwards them both to ECOSOC 32 and to those spe-
cialized agencies with responsibilities in the reported areas.
33
ECOSOC is also empowered to "make arrangements" with the special-
ized agencies to receive reports from them on "the progress made in
achieving the observance of the provisions of the present Covenant fall-
ing within the scope of their activities," including information regarding
any decisions or recommendations made by them with respect to the im-
plementation of the specified rights. 34 ECOSOC is not empowered to
receive complaints alleging non-compliance with its provisions, either
from state parties or from individuals. In this respect, the ICESCR dif-
fers from the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.3
5
ECOSOC may transmit both the state reports and the reports of spe-
cialized agencies to the Commission on Human Rights3 6 for "study and
general recommendation" or merely "for information. '37 The ICESCR
does not provide for this Commission to pass judgment on the adequacy
of a state's compliance with the ICESCR, but merely to make general,
30. ICESCR, supra note 6, art. 16(1).
31. Id. art. 17(1). A six-year program for the receipt of reports was established by
ECOSOC, with reports on articles 6 through 9 due in 1977, reports on articles 10 through 12
due in 1979, and the last group of reports covering articles 13 through 15 due in 1981. A.
MOWER, supra note 2, at 31-35. The compliance of state parties with this schedule has been
very poor. By May 1984, almost three years after the last reports were due, only 27 of 69
states had submitted third stage reports, originally due in September 1981. Id. at 40.
32. ICESCR, supra note 6, art. 16(2).
33. These include, for example, the International Labor Organization (ILO), the World
Health Organization (WHO), and the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO).
34. ICESCR, supra note 6, art. 18. Since the specialized agencies receive copies of the
state reports and are authorized to submit their own reports to ECOSOC, some latitude exists
for them to undertake state-specific reviews of compliance in the areas of their competence and
for their conclusions to be received by ECOSOC. The ILO, in particular, has taken advantage
of this opening. See A. MOWER, supra note 2, at 69-78.
35. Though the compulsory implementation provisions of the Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights establish only a state reporting system, there is an optional article allowing state
parties to authorize the Covenant's Human Rights Committee to receive complaints from one
state party alleging a violation of the agreement by another, and there is an optional protocol
allowing state parties to recognize the competence of the Committee to receive complaints
from individuals. ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 41; Optional Protocol to the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966) [hereinafter Optional Protocol].
36. The Commission on Human Rights is a subsidiary of ECOSOC. Established in 1946,
it now consists of representatives of 44 member states and operates with a broad-based man-
date to study, promote, and monitor observance of human rights around the world. See U.N.
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, supra note 29, at 19, 302.
37. ICESCR, supra note 6, art. 19.
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non-state-specific recommendations. If the Commission on Human
Rights makes general recommendations in light of these reports, then
any state party to the ICESCR and any of the concerned specialized
agencies may submit "comments" to ECOSOC in response. 38
With the information and comments thus received, ECOSOC itself
may submit "reports with recommendations of a general nature" to the
General Assembly.39 ECOSOC may also "bring to the attention of other
organs of the United Nations... any matters arising out of the reports"
it receives under the ICESCR in order to assist those organs in deciding
"on the advisability of international measures" to further the aims of the
ICESCR.4° Again, these procedures do not include a mandate for any of
the involved bodies to pass judgment on the adequacy of a state's compli-
ance with its ICESCR obligations.
The effectiveness of the monitoring mechanisms established under the
ICESCR has been questioned. In particular, the quality of review pro-
vided for state reports under procedures established by ECOSOC has
been a source of ongoing controversy.41 ECOSOC originally established
a fifteen-member Sessional Working Group to consider the state reports
and to submit a report to the full Council. 42 At first, the Sessional Work-
ing Group consisted of government representatives, with seats on the
committee rotating among state parties according to a formula that en-
sured a geographic distribution of members. In response to widespread
criticism of the quality of its review work, the Sessional Working Group
was reformed in 1982. Henceforth, those states which were assigned
seats were represented by experts in economic and social policy. The
committee was renamed the Sessional Working Group of Governmental
Experts on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights.43 Criticism of the new Working
Group continued, and in 1985 agreement was reached to replace it with a
committee of eighteen experts serving in their personal capacity. This
body is called the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,44
38. Id. art. 20.
39. Id. art. 21.
40. Id. art. 22.
41. See, e.g., A. MOWER, supra note 2, at 31-65; Commentary, Implementation of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: ECOSOC Working Group,
27 I.C.J. REv. 26 (1981).
42. A. MOWER, supra note 2, at 34-35, 41-43.
43. E.S.C. Res. E/1982/33, U.N. Doc. E/1982/INF/7, at 57 (1982); see A. MOWER,
supra note 2, at 52-60.
44. E.S.C. Res. 1985/17, 1985 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 15, U.N. Doc. E/1985/85
(1986).
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and it met for the first time in March 1987. 45 This process of change
clearly demonstrates that the monitoring mechanisms established under
the ICESCR should not be regarded as a fixed system, but rather as one
that, within limits, can be modified over time.
B. The European Social Charter
Like the ICESCR, the European Social Charter relies exclusively on a
state reporting system for its implementation.46 There are, however, sig-
nificant differences between the two systems. First, the Charter explicitly
provides for the establishment of an Independent Committee of Experts
to receive the required state reports.47 This Committee consists of not
more than seven persons who serve in their individual capacity, not as
governmental representatives. Members of the Committee are appointed
to staggered six-year terms of office by the Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe48 "from a list of independent experts of the highest
integrity and of recognized competence in international social ques-
tions."' 49 A representative of the ILO also participates "in a consultative
capacity in the deliberations of the Committee of Experts." 50 Although
ECOSOC has now established a similar committee of independent ex-
perts, 51 the fact that the Charter Committee is mandated by the agree-
ment itself lends it added stature and independence. A second difference
is that under the Charter, certain national organizations of employers
and trade unions are entitled to comment to the Committee of Experts
on the reports prepared by their governments.5 2
The "conclusions" of the Committee of Experts are transmitted to two
bodies. One is the Governmental Committee on the European Social
45. See E.S.C. Decision 1986/123, U.N. Doc. E/1986/INF/4, at 71 (1986).
46. For a fuller description of the Charter's implementation mechanisms, see Vasak, The
Council of Europe, in INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 28, at 457, 539-42. For a
description of their actual operation, see A. MOWER, supra note 2, at 203-38.
47. Charter, supra note 7, art. 24.
48. Id. art. 25(1), (2). The Committee of Ministers consists of the foreign ministers of all
of the member states of the Council of Europe. The Council's Parliamentary Assembly (com-
monly called the European Parliament) is the organization's chief deliberative body, but the
Committee of Ministers, which has independent deliberative authority, is the only body em-
powered to take action in the name of the Council. See Statute of the Council of Europe, May
5, 1949, art. 13, 87 U.N.T.S. 103, 110. The Council's specialized institutions include the Euro-
pean Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights. Both the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, adopted Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention], and the Charter, supra note 7, are
products of the Council.
49. Charter, supra note 7, art. 25(l).
50. Id. art. 26.
51. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
52. Charter, supra note 7, arts. 23, 24.
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Charter (Governmental Committee), a subcommittee of the Governmen-
tal Social Committee of the Council of Europe,53 which consists of repre-
sentatives of the governments of state parties to the Charter.5 4 The other
body is the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe,55 which
represents the European voting public rather than its governments.5 6
Both of these groups consider the Committee of Experts report and then
transmit their own "conclusions" or "views" to the Committee of Minis-
ters of the Council of Europe, a body which, like the Governmental
Committee, represents governments 57 The Committee of Ministers
may, on the basis of these reports and consultations, "make to each Con-
tracting Party any necessary recommendations. ' 58 Thus, another signifi-
cant difference between the implementation procedures of the ICESCR
and those of the Charter lies in the nature of the final response that the
monitoring bodies are empowered to make. Under the ICESCR, only
general recommendations are mandated; under the Charter, the monitor-
ing bodies are instructed to make state-specific conclusions and
recommendations.
In practice the Committee of Ministers (with the support of the Gov-
ernmental Committee59) has been hesitant to make state-specific recom-
mendations, even though it has come under considerable pressure from
the Parliamentary Assembly (and indirectly from the Committee of Ex-
perts) to do So. 6 0 Its inaction demonstrates that Western European gov-
ernments are more reluctant to criticize one another than are bodies that
do not represent governments.6 1 The Committee of Experts has been
particularly vigorous in its interpretation of its mandate to review the
state reports submitted under the Charter.62 It has performed its as-
signed task with a thoroughness that is in marked contrast to the per-
53. Id. art. 27(1).
54. Id. art. 27(2). The Governmental Committee consists of one representative of each
state party to the Charter. In addition, no more than two international employer organiza-
tions and two international trade union organizations are represented "as observers in a con-
sultative capacity at its meetings." Up to two representatives of international non-
governmental organizations with expertise in relevant areas may also be consulted. Id.
55. Id. art. 28.
56. The Parliamentary Assembly (formerly called the Consultative Assembly) is composed
of representatives selected by the member states of the Council of Europe. Each nation's rep-
resentatives are elected by the nation's parliament or appointed according to a procedure (such
as direct election) chosen by the nation. The Assembly's statutory powers are strictly consul-
tative, but it has considerable influence as a voice of collective European public opinion. See
supra note 48.
57. Charter, supra note 7, arts. 27(3), 28; see supra note 48.
58. Charter, supra note 7, art. 29.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 53-54.
60. A. MOWER, supra note 2, at 208-30.
61. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
62. A. MOWER, supra note 2, at 208-30.
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formance of the Sessional Working Group originally established under
the ICESCR.
63
C. The Constitution of the International Labor Organization
While the monitoring mechanism established under the European So-
cial Charter has proved to be more rigorous in practice than its ICESCR
counterpart, there is widespread agreement that the ILO's monitoring
activities are even more thorough. 4 This is so even though the ILO
Constitution is less precise than either the ICESCR or the Charter in
specifying the structure of the monitoring process upon which the organ-
ization primarily relies. The ILO Constitution mandates a vaguely de-
fined state reporting procedure, 65 and a much more specific complaint
procedure.66 The latter has been used only infrequently, however, 67
while the former has evolved into a powerful monitoring device.
The ILO Constitution requires merely that a member state "make an
annual report to the International Labour Office on the measures which
it has taken to give effect to the provisions of Conventions to which it is a
party," and that the Organization's Director General "lay before" the
ILO General Conference a "summary" of these reports. 68 In 1926, how-
ever, the ILO General Conference agreed to establish a Committee of
Experts whose duties included the receipt and review of state compliance
reports. 69 The Committee is responsible for reporting to the General
Conference on "the extent to which it appears that the position of each
state is in conformity with the terms" of each covenant it has ratified.70
63. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
64. For citations to the relevant literature, see Charney, Transnational Corporations and
Developing Public International Law, 1983 DUKE L.J. 748, 778 n.74.
65. ILO Constitution, supra note 8, art. 22.
66. Id. arts. 23-34.
67. A. MOWER, supra note 2, at 97. The complaint procedure has, however, come into
greater use in recent years. Of the 14 complaints filed during the ILO's existence, 13 were
entered between 1961 and 1983, and 8 were filed in the 1970's. Id.
68. ILO Constitution, supra note 8, arts. 22-23. The General Conference of the ILO is the
organizations deliberative body. Each member nation has four seats in the General Confer-
ence, two of which are filled by government delegates and two going to "delegates representing
respectively the employers and the workpeople of each of the Members." Id. art, 3(1). The
latter two delegates are nominated by the member states that undertake to choose them "in
agreement with the industrial organizations, if such organizations exist, which are most repre-
sentative of employers or workpeople, as the case may be, in their respective countries." Id.
art. 3(5). For the history of this tripartite structure, see supra note 21. For a more detailed
description of the schedule pertaining to reporting obligations currently in force with respect
to ratified conventions, see A. MOWER, supra note 2, at 81-82.
69. A. MOWER, supra note 2, at 70, 81.
70. Report [3] of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recom-
mendations (Part 4A), International Labor Conference, 63rd Sess. (1977), at 13, quoted in A.
MOWER, supra note 2, at 82.
408
Vol. 12:396, 1987
Monitoring Economic and Social Rights Treaties
The review process undertaken by the Committee of Experts is rigorous
and has proven to be controversial. In particular, socialist countries have
criticized the Committee for failing to reflect a proper balance in its as-
sessment of conditions in countries with different economic, social, and
political systems.
7'
As noted above, the ILO complaint system is described in considerably
more detail in the Organization's constitution than is the ILO's state re-
porting system. Actually, two different complaint systems are estab-
lished, a limited one for non-governmental associations of employers or
workers, and a more complete adjudicatory system for government com-
plaints. Employer or worker associations may make "representations" to
the International Labor Office alleging non-compliance with a Conven-
tion by a member state, and the accused government can respond to the
allegation.72 If no response is forthcoming, or if the response is "not
deemed to be satisfactory," both the representation and the government's
response, if any, may be published.73 No further proceedings are man-
dated. In contrast, when a state that has ratified an ILO convention sub-
mits a complaint alleging non-compliance with the convention by
another ratifying state, a Commission of Inquiry is appointed to investi-
gate the matter.74 The Commission of Inquiry makes findings of fact and
may make recommendations "as to the steps which should be taken to
meet the complaint and the time within which they should be taken."' 75
The government parties to the proceeding may accept or reject these rec-
ommendations, and, in the latter case, may submit the dispute to the
International Court of Justice for binding adjudication. 76
The governmental complaint system is thus quite powerful, and the
non-governmental system, although more limited, at least allows com-
plaints from non-governmental organizations to be formally received and
permits accused governments to respond. This is substantially more than
other economic and social human rights agreements provide, and though
neither the "complaint" nor the "representation" mechanism has been
used frequently in the past, both are becoming increasingly popular. 77
71. Id. at 89-90. For a general description of the Committee's work, see id. at 81-90.
72. ILO Constitution, supra note 8, art. 24.
73. Id. art. 25.
74. Id.
75. Id. art. 28.
76. Id. arts. 29, 31-32.
77. While the representation procedure was used only 13 times between 1919 and 1980, it
was used 7 times between 1980 and 1983. Similarly, the complaint procedure was used only 6
times between 1919 and 1970, but 8 times from 1971 until 1983. A. MOWER, supra note 2, at
97.
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III. Advantages and Disadvantages of Different Monitoring
Mechanisms 7
8
The monitoring mechanisms established under the ICESCR, the Euro-
pean Social Charter, and the ILO Constitution are all, with the exception
of the ILO complaint procedure, state reporting systems. Yet there are
significant differences among the systems. If other implementation
mechanisms are considered, still greater variety is possible. In the dis-
cussion that follows, the inherent strengths and weaknesses of three gen-
eral types of monitoring systems will be analyzed. The first type consists
of state reporting systems such as those discussed above. The second
type consists of complaint systems such as the one established under the
ILO Constitution. The third type is a system of country reports prepared
by an independent commission of inquiry, either as a supplement to, or
as a replacement for, state reports submitted by governments.
The variations considered in each type of system involve one or more
of the following factors: (1) limitations on the type or source of input
allowed in the monitoring process; (2) the composition and status of the
monitoring bodies; (3) the procedures followed by the monitoring bodies;
and (4) the nature of the decisions or recommendations that the monitor-
ing bodies are authorized to make. The focus of the discussion will be on
the suitability of each type of monitoring system for the implementation
of an economic and social human rights agreement, and the effect of vari-
ations in each type of monitoring system on both the system's effective-
ness and its political acceptability.
A. State Reporting Systems
A state reporting system is the least intrusive means of monitoring the
compliance of individual state parties to a human rights agreement.
Since most states are protective of their sovereignty and suspicious of the
motives of other states, they generally prefer state reporting systems.
There are, however, other reasons for relying on such a system. If the
obligations assumed by a state involve promises to work towards the real-
ization of certain rights, rather than immediate guarantees, then those
rights may not be justiciable. A complaint would have to allege that a
state failed to make a good faith effort to promote the right in question,
rather than simply that it did not observe it. Such a claim would be
78. For general discussions of the effectiveness of alternative implementation mechanisms
employable in human rights agreements, see Capotorti, The International Measures of
Implementation Included in the Covenants on Human Rights, in INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION, supra note 17, at 137; Vasak, The Distinguishing Criteria of Institutions, in
INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 28, at 215.
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exceedingly difficult to prove in a traditional adversarial proceeding.
Hence, with this type of rights provision periodic reports detailing a
state's efforts to meet its obligations may be the most appropriate method
of evaluating its compliance. A systematic state reporting system also
may make more sense than a complaint procedure where the agreement
in question is not really intended to protect individual or group rights
directly, but to facilitate international cooperation in joint undertakings.
It may be, for example, that this motivation underlies the diverging obli-
gations incurred by parties to the ICESCR and the Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, 79 a difference that is obscured by the rhetorical ten-
dency to describe the two agreements as reflecting similar commitments.
Are monitoring mechanisms which rely on state reporting systems in-
herently weaker than those based on complaint systems? There is a ten-
dency to think so because of the generally acknowledged weakness of the
ICESCR and the Charter in comparison to human rights agreements
that provide for complaint systems.80 Experience with the ILO state re-
porting system, however, suggests that the weaknesses of the ICESCR
and the Charter stem not so much from inherent limitations in state re-
porting systems as from the limited nature of the obligations assumed by
state parties to the latter agreements and from a lack of political support
of governments for the conclusory recommendations of monitoring bod-
ies consisting of independent experts. Promises by a state to try to realize
certain rights over time are clearly weaker than immediate guarantees of
the same rights, and the effectiveness of any monitoring mechanism will
depend on the amount of political support it commands.
Given the type of obligation incurred by the state parties to an agree-
ment-to guarantee or merely to promote the enumerated rights-and
the general level of political support that exists for the enforcement ef-
fort, the effectiveness and political palatability of a state reporting system
are likely to depend on secondary characteristics of the system. These
include the form of the reports, whether cognizance is given to critical
responses they engender, the composition of the monitoring body that
receives the reports, the degree of inquisitorial power vested in the moni-
79. Cf. Alston, supra note 5, at 94-95 (contrasting reporting systems of ILO Constitution
and ICESCR).
80. See Schwelb, Some Aspects of the Measures of Implementation of the International Cov-
enant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1 REvUE DES DROITS DE L'HoMME 363, 377
(1968). For provisions in civil and political human rights agreements establishing complaint
systems, see ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 41; Optional Protocol, supra note 35; European Con-
vention, supra note 48, arts. 24-25; American Convention on Human Rights, Jan. 7, 1970, arts.
44-45, O.A.S. Official Records, OEA/Ser.K/XVI/1.1, Doc. 65, Rev. 1, Corr. 1 [hereinafter
American Convention].
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toring body, and the extent of the monitoring body's own reporting
powers.
A state report drafted without clear directives regarding the nature of
the information to be provided will probably be of limited value in judg-
ing the extent of the state's compliance with a human rights agreement.
If, on the other hand, very specific information is demanded, based on
clearly conceived performance indexes, then state reports can be a useful
and efficient way for a monitoring body to obtain the data it needs.8
This is especially true with regard to agreements respecting economic
and social rights, since standardized quantitative data (e.g., unemploy-
ment rates, disease and mortality rates among specified population
groups, school enrollment figures) generally provide better measures of
national performance respecting the protection of these rights than they
do of civil and political rights. Moreover, the reliability of the informa-
tion provided in state reports may be enhanced if the body receiving the
reports is given the power to audit the information, with on-site inspec-
tion tours if necessary, and to make follow-up queries addressed to the
reporting state.
The composition of the monitoring bodies in a state reporting system
will also have an impact on the system's effectiveness. The most signifi-
cant variable in this regard is whether the reports are examined by a
political body whose members take instruction from the governments
they represent (such as the Governmental Committee on the European
Social Charter or the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Eu-
rope82), or by a body whose members sit in their individual capacity as
"experts" or "guardians" of the rights protected by the agreement (such
as the Committee of Experts established under the Charter83). As one
commentator has noted:
[A] body composed of government representatives must take into account
considerations of prestige and respect of State sovereignty .... A body
composed of individuals independent from governments is on the contrary
exclusively bound to general interests: its members will enjoy larger free-
dom of initiative and will be capable of assuming a critical position, if they
think it necessary, with greater objectiveness. 84
81. For a description of actual practice under the ICESCR and European Social Charter
state reporting systems with regard to the specification of the format of submitted reports, see
A. MOWER, supra note 2, at 36-39, 48-52, 205-08. On ILO practice, see generally E. LANDY,
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION: THIRTY YEARS OF ILO EXPERI-
ENCE (1968).
82. See supra text accompanying notes 47-63.
83. Id.
84. Capotorti, supra note 78, at 136.
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The same commentator concedes, however, that where state reports are
intended more to promote international cooperation among states than
to protect individuals from violations of their rights, a political organ
may be the appropriate monitoring body.85 This latter consideration
seems to have prevailed in the original design of the monitoring system
established under the ICESCR, but the European Social Charter demon-
strates that compromise solutions are also possible, with more than one
body having successive responsibility for considering state reports.8 6
Another important factor influencing the effectiveness and political ac-
ceptability of a state reporting system is whether monitoring bodies are
given the authority to take official cognizance of critical responses to the
reports by non-governmental organizations. Under the ICESCR, no pro-
vision is made for such responses to be received. The ILO Constitution is
also silent on the matter, but comments by national organizations of em-
ployers and employees are, in practice, received and considered by the
ILO Committee of Experts. Indeed, they are actively sought.8 7 Under
the European Social Charter, responses may be received, but only from
specified national organizations of employers and trade unions.s8 Re-
quiring states to publish their reports, and allowing monitoring bodies to
consider responses to the reports (submitted by other states, non-govern-
mental organizations, and individuals) would go a long way towards
strengthening a state reporting system. Such an arrangement would put
pressure on a state to respond to its critics, much as it would have to
respond to individual complaints if such complaints were permitted.
Also, a state reporting system that institutionalizes critical comment
would probably be better suited than a complaint system for monitoring
compliance with agreements that require promotional efforts rather than
the immediate protection of rights. In a complaint system, the burden of
going forward with proof of non-compliance falls initially on the com-
plainant. It would be extremely difficult to carry this burden where a
lack of good faith effort on the part of the state must be shown. In con-
trast, a state reporting system in effect places the burden of going for-
ward with proof of compliance on the state. Critics of a state's
performance in promoting human rights may find it easier to present
their "case" when it is framed as a response to the state's own report of
its efforts.
85. Id.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 46-58.
87. A. MOWER, supra note 2, at 94-97.
88. Charter, supra note 7, art. 23.
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As the European Social Charter demonstrates, however, a state report-
ing system does not have to open the floodgates to independent com-
ment. Standing to submit formal responses to a monitoring body can be
limited. States that are unwilling to countenance a complaint system
might therefore prefer a state reporting system that vests a right of re-
sponse only in certain designated organizations. Over time, more groups
may be granted standing as the state parties to the agreement become
more comfortable with its monitoring procedures.
Still another factor influencing the effectiveness and political accepta-
bility of a state reporting system is whether limits are imposed on the
type of judgments and recommendations that monitoring bodies are em-
powered to make. The principle issue here is whether these judgments
and recommendations can be state-specific (as is the practice of the Com-
mittee of Experts established under the European Social Charter) or
whether they must be "general" in character (as ICESCR provisions sug-
gest). A further distinction can be made between the power to issue find-
ings of fact, judgments regarding compliance, and recommendations for
policy changes or initiatives.
Having the power to issue state-specific evaluations clearly enhances a
monitoring body's ability to put pressure on individual governments.
However, that ability may be constrained by limiting the body to the
issuance of certain types of evaluations. For example, a monitoring body
consisting of "technical experts" might be empowered to issue state-spe-
cific factual summaries concerning economic and social conditions in
particular countries, but be prohibited from passing final judgment as to
the state's compliance with its legal obligations or from making state-
specific policy recommendations.
Alternatively, a monitoring body might be empowered to make state-
specific policy recommendations without passing explicit judgment on
the adequacy of the country's current efforts to realize economic and so-
cial rights. If all the state parties to an agreement receive such "technical
advice," tailored to local conditions, then the monitoring body's work
might be perceived as carrying less political sting. Thus, while an agree-
ment empowering a monitoring body to reach state-specific conclusions
of all three types would clearly be the strongest, a wide variety of weaker
arrangements are available if political factors dictate their consideration.
B. Complaint Systems
The most generally recognized alternative to a state reporting system
is a complaint system. Such systems have been established in human
rights agreements respecting civil and political rights, but are typically
Vol. 12:396, 1987
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established under separate articles or protocols to which state parties to
the overall agreement are invited, but not required, to adhere. 89
In contrast, among principal international agreements respecting eco-
nomic and social human rights, only the ILO Constitution provides for
the establishment of a complaint system. One frequently cited explana-
tion for this fact is that differences in the substantive nature of the rights
protected under the two kinds of covenants call for different implementa-
tion mechanisms. A complaint system is deemed appropriate for enforc-
ing justiciable rights, that is, rights that are guaranteed immediately, but
not for enforcing compliance with purely promotional obligations. In the
latter case, it is argued, a state reporting system is more likely to en-
courage the international cooperation necessary to realize the goals of the
agreement.90
Yet the European Social Charter eschews a complaint procedure, de-
spite the fact that state parties to it assume obligations to guarantee cer-
tain rights immediately. It seems likely that a second reason that
complaint procedures are not often utilized in international agreements
respecting economic and social rights is simply that governments have
been disinclined to submit to such an intrusive monitoring mechanism,
and the political interests favoring the strict enforcement of economic
and social rights have not been strong enough to overcome this
resistance.
Obligations to promote the realization of human rights over time,
rather than to guarantee them immediately, may be better monitored by
means of a reporting system. It does not follow, however, that a com-
plaint procedure would be a useless appendage to such a system. Com-
plaint procedures could effectively supplement reporting systems in
implementing international agreements respecting economic and social
rights-provided that states could be induced to accept them.
There are instances in which promotional obligations could be viewed
as giving rise to justiciable claims of non-compliance. For example, a
state party to the ICESCR is obligated "to take steps ... to the maxi-
mum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively"
the rights specified in the agreement. 91 If a state undertakes to imple-
ment policies that cause a clear deterioration in the protection hitherto
afforded a right specified in the agreement, a complainant might argue
89. See ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 41; Optional Protocol, supra note 35; European Con-
vention, supra note 48, art. 25; American Convention, supra note 80, art. 45.
90. See Schwelb, supra note 17, at 106; van Boven, Distinguishing Criteria of Human
Rights, in INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 28, at 43, 50.
91. ICESCR, supra note 6, art. 2(1).
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that the state was violating its obligation to work for the progressive
achievement of that fight. Even if a state merely tolerated a deteriora-
tion in conditions affecting the degree of protection afforded a particular
fight, its inaction might justify a claim that the state had not taken steps
to the maximum of its available resources to realize the right. Reduc-
tions in government-financed social welfare benefits could give rise to
claims of the first type, while intentional government inaction in the face
of clear deterioration in certain indices of social well-being could give rise
to claims of the second type. The legal theory advanced in both instances
would be that the agreement imposes ratcheted obligations on state par-
ties to the agreement with respect to the listed rights. That is, state par-
ties may not be obligated to achieve any particular level of protection for
the listed rights, but once having achieved a certain level, they may be
obligated to maintain it.
When the agreement imposes obligations to guarantee certain rights
immediately, then the major obstacle to the use of a complaint procedure
seems to be the reluctance of states to submit to one. To overcome this
reluctance, complaint systems may be constrained in various ways to
render them more politically palatable. The simplest type of constraint
would be to limit standing to submit complaints. The ILO Constitution
adopts this approach and grants standing only to state parties and desig-
nated non-governmental organizations. 92 Similarly, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights allows state parties to adhere sep-
arately to complaint systems with different limitations on the standing of
complainants. Article 41 permits state parties to the overall agreement
to recognize the competence of the Human Rights Committee to receive
complaints alleging their non-compliance with the agreement from other
state parties that similarly adhere to the article.93 The Optional Protocol
to the agreement allows complaints also to be received from individuals.
Under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, the competence of the European Commis-
sion of Human Rights to receive complaints by state parties alleging non-
compliance on the part of other state parties is automatic, 94 but com-
plaints from individuals, groups of individuals, or non-governmental or-
ganizations may be received only if the state party charged with non-
compliance has explicitly recognized the competence of the Commission
to do so.95 Under the American Convention on Human Rights, this pat-
92. See supra text accompanying notes 72-77.
93. ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 41.
94. European Convention, supra note 48, art. 24.
95. Id. art. 25.
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tern is reversed. The competence of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights to receive complaints from individuals is automatic, 96 but
it may receive complaints from state parties only if the state against
which the complaint is made has recognized its competence to do so.
97
Another means of constraining a complaint system is to limit the juris-
diction of monitoring bodies. Typical restrictions include requirements
that domestic judicial remedies be exhausted before resort is had to the
international forum,98 prohibitions on the receipt of complaints that have
been submitted under another international agreement, 99 and provisions
analogous to statutes of limitations. 1°
C. Independent Commission of Inquiry Systems
Complaints and state reports are not the only possible sources of pri-
mary input for a human rights monitoring system. Reports prepared by
independent commissions of inquiry can also perform this function. In-
deed, before the adoption of the American Convention on Human
Rights, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights relied exten-
sively on this monitoring mechanism, deriving its authority directly from
the Charter of the Organization of American States.101 The Commis-
sion's practice, however, has been to undertake individual country stud-
ies only when it has received substantial allegations of widespread human
rights abuses in the country. 102 It has not attempted a systematic survey
of human rights conditions within each of the member states of the
O.A.S. Such surveys could, however, serve as the primary monitoring
mechanism for an international human rights agreement and would be
especially useful for monitoring an agreement respecting economic and
social rights.
A monitoring system based on systematic country studies prepared by
an independent commission of inquiry would have a number of advan-
tages over complaint and state reporting systems. The most obvious
would be the greater objectivity of the reports as compared to those pre-
96. American Convention, supra note 80, art. 44.
97. Id. art 45.
98. ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 41(1)(c); Optional Protocol, supra note 35, art. 5(2)(b);
European Convention, supra note 48, art. 26; American Convention, supra note 80, art. 46(a).
99. Optional Protocol, supra note 35, art. 5(2)(a); European Convention, supra note 48,
art. 27; American Convention, supra note 80, art. 46(c).
100. European Convention, supra note 48, art. 26; American Convention, supra note 80,
art. 46(b).
101. See Buergenthal, The Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights, in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 439, 479-87 (T.
Meron ed. 1984); T. BUERGENTHAL, R. NORRIS & D. SHELTON, PROTECTING HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS: SELECTED PROBLEMS 140-92 (1982).
102. Buergenthal, supra note 101, at 480.
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pared by states themselves. There are, however, other advantages. First,
it could serve as an excellent vehicle for developing and applying uniform
standards for assessing compliance with a particular agreement. Moni-
toring bodies charged with the evaluation of state reports currently are
hindered in their efforts to develop uniform assessment standards by the
lack of uniformity in the information they receive. Detailed instructions
can be provided to governments regarding the information that they are
requested to submit,103 but it would clearly be easier to develop uniform
assessment standards if the monitoring body was empowered to complete
its own report forms and to gather information from all available sources
in doing so.
The data relevant to an assessment of a nation's performance respect-
ing the realization of economic and social rights are particularly diverse
and specialized, ranging from aggregate economic performance data to
information concerning the administration of statutory benefit programs.
Much of this data is already available because of its relevance to a broad
range of policy questions in which governments have a natural interest.
Nevertheless, marshalling and collating it for specific analytic purposes is
both difficult and costly. Developing objective standards for measuring a
nation's relative performance in realizing economic and social rights
would require considerable expertise and financial backing, as well as
political support. If the requisite financial and political support existed
to undertake such a task, an independent commission of inquiry could
more easily pursue it than a monitoring body operating within the frame-
work of a complaint or state reporting system.
Another advantage of an independent commission of inquiry system is
its particular suitability for monitoring progress towards the realization
of rights that a state has a duty to promote rather than to guarantee. The
task of monitoring compliance with promotional obligations necessarily
relies on the consistent measurement and reporting of performance data
over time. An independent commission of inquiry could be expected to
do a better job of this than would governments called upon to report
their own progress. Since the obligations incurred by state parties to in-
ternational agreements respecting economic and social human rights are
so frequently promotional, this can be regarded as a particular advantage
of the independent commission of inquiry mechanism for monitoring
compliance with such agreements.
Two final advantages of such a monitoring system, at least in compari-
son to a complaint system, are its suitability for assessing the role played
103. See A. MOWER, supra note 2, at 36-39, 88, 205-08.
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by extranational forces in constraining a nation's ability to comply with
its human rights obligations, and its suitability for assessing systemic as
opposed to individual human rights abuses. Both of these advantages are
likely to be particularly important in monitoring compliance with inter-
national agreements respecting economic and social human rights. Gov-
ernments frequently blame extranational forces for their failure to give
effect to economic and social human rights, and a complaint proceeding
does not provide a particularly good forum for assessing the validity of
these claims. Also, abuses of economic and social human rights are more
likely to be systemic than individual, and a mechanism suited for the
study of aggregate trends is more likely to be useful in monitoring such
abuses than a mechanism designed to adjudicate individual claims.
Like other monitoring devices, the independent commission of inquiry
mechanism also has its disadvantages. It would be expensive, subject to
constant political pressure from governments seeking favorable comment
on their domestic economic and social policies, and would have to over-
come the hostility that governments tend to feel for outside monitoring
of domestic policies. A complaint system would also result in outside
scrutiny of governmental actions, but such scrutiny would be intermit-
tent and narrowly focused, and might even be entirely avoided. A system
of regular reports by outside monitors would probably be seen as more
intrusive.
Just as it would be possible to limit the reporting powers of monitoring
bodies under a state reporting system, so the contents of the reports
could be limited to make an independent reporting system more palat-
able politically. For example, findings of fact regarding economic and
social conditions could be included without drawing conclusions regard-
ing the adequacy of a government's efforts to improve those conditions.
Also, as with the mandate given to ECOSOC under the ICESCR, the
monitoring body could be limited to general, as opposed to state-specific,
recommendations based on its findings from the individual country re-
ports.104 The long-term benefit that could derive from the establishment
of a systematic international reporting system could justify such com-
promises, and the authority of the monitoring body could gradually be
increased over time, as it proved its objectivity and as governments be-
came more accustomed to outside monitoring.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 39-40.
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Conclusion
A wide variety of monitoring mechanisms may be effective in imple-
menting international agreements respecting economic and social human
rights. Though state reporting systems are the most widely used mecha-
nism, other systems are feasible even where an agreement imposes only
promotional obligations on the parties to it. Also, a state reporting sys-
tem need not result in weak monitoring. Indeed, the key conclusion to
be drawn from this comment is that the secondary characteristics of a
monitoring regime may be more important in determining its overall ef-
fectiveness than its general structure. Moreover, many of these secon-
dary characteristics are susceptible to evolutionary change under existing
human rights agreements. Thus, in drafting new agreements, and in try-
ing to improve the monitoring mechanisms established under already ex-
isting ones, particular attention should be paid to the detail features of
the monitoring mechanism. By careful adjustment of these features, it
may be possible to enhance the overall effectiveness of the monitoring
process, while still being responsive to the sensitivities of governments in
matters touching their sovereignty.
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